Introduction
Automotive cybersecurity has rapidly become a critical priority as vehicles integrate more electronic control units (ECUs), connectivity, and advanced driving features. While past efforts often focused on software, attention is now turning to the hardware level – especially the semiconductor chips that execute safety-critical and security functions. Secure automotive chips can protect cryptographic keys, verify firmware integrity, and resist tampering, forming the foundation of a vehicle’s overall cybersecurity. In China, regulators and industry experts have been developing a comprehensive hardware security standard for automotive chips to address emerging threats. This upcoming national standard (a GB/T recommended standard) aims to ensure that in-vehicle chips possess robust security mechanisms by design. The following analysis provides an overview of this draft standard’s development and its key technical requirements, as well as what it means for OEMs and Tier-1 suppliers looking to comply and maintain access to the Chinese market.
Regulatory Framework
China’s automotive chip security standard is currently in draft form and undergoing industry consultation. The project was initiated in 2022 under a dedicated working group of experts, and has since gone through numerous iterations and meetings to refine its content. As of April 2025, the drafting group had conducted 18 meetings to debate and revise the technical requirements, test methods, and scope of the specification. The draft text is now essentially complete and is being circulated within the working group for feedback. After internal consensus, the next steps involve polishing the text based on comments and then moving toward broader review and approval.
Although formal standard number designations are pending final release, the effort is commonly referred to as a new GB/T (national recommended) standard for automotive chip information security. It has been spearheaded by a drafting committee likely comprising government agencies, research institutes, automakers, and semiconductor companies in China. Their collaborative process – including detailed chapter-by-chapter reviews and multiple revisions – underscores the importance Chinese authorities place on securing automotive hardware. The standard is part of a broader regulatory framework in China that addresses vehicle cybersecurity (complementing earlier guidelines for vehicle software security and data protection). Once finalized, this GB/T specification could be referenced in certification requirements (such as China’s CCC certification for auto parts) or future regulations, effectively making its adoption necessary for any company aiming to supply vehicle chips or electronic systems in the Chinese market. In short, China is proactively creating its own baseline for automotive hardware security, and international OEMs and suppliers will need to follow this development closely.
Technical Requirements Overview
The draft standard defines a comprehensive set of mandatory hardware security capabilities for automotive chips. It breaks down the overall security needs of in-vehicle systems and maps them to specific security functions that a chip must implement. Key areas of focus include cryptographic features, secure boot processes, key management, data protection, and controls tied to the chip’s lifecycle. Below is an overview of some of the most important requirements:
- Key Protection: The standard places heavy emphasis on cryptographic key management and protection within the chip. Automotive chips must implement secure key generation (using quality hardware random number sources) and keep master keys in a hardware-protected trust anchor on the chip. A unique hardware root key should serve as the system’s root of trust, and any non-volatile keys stored off-chip (if used at all) must be encrypted under that on-chip root key. The chip must provide isolated, tamper-resistant storage areas so that keys and related secrets cannot be accessed or extracted via any physical or logical interface. During operation, keys’ integrity should be checked before use, and no sensitive key material or related information may leak through external interfaces or debugging ports. The standard also requires that once a key’s use is finished, the chip should immediately purge it from any temporary memory to prevent remnants from being recovered. Additionally, strict access control mechanisms are mandated – for example, the chip should detect and respond to any unauthorized attempts to access or tamper with keys (e.g. by automatically destroying or locking the affected key) and enforce permissions for key usage (including support for multiple key owners or domains if applicable) to ensure keys can only be used or updated by authorized entities. It also covers the full key lifecycle: chips need to support secure key provisioning (establishment), key derivation functions, secure key updates (with old keys being immediately and securely erased), and secure key destruction on demand. In essence, robust Hardware Security Module (HSM)-like functionality is expected on the chip to manage all cryptographic keys safely through their lifecycle.
- Cryptographic Algorithm Support: The hardware must support strong cryptographic algorithms and adhere to recognized standards. The draft specifies that automotive chips should only employ cryptographic algorithms that meet relevant international, national, or industry cryptography standards – or otherwise be publicly known algorithms that have undergone sufficient scrutiny – and avoid any algorithms with known security weaknesses. This implies that chips will be expected to implement approved cipher suites (including China’s own standard algorithms where applicable) and use appropriate key lengths and parameters to ensure adequate security strength. Moreover, the standard addresses the performance of cryptographic operations: it requires that a chip’s claimed cryptographic performance (for example, the throughput or latency of encryption/decryption under certain conditions) is verified and consistent with the manufacturer’s specifications. In practice, this means chip makers must not only include crypto engines (for symmetric ciphers, public key algorithms, hash functions, etc.) but also provide honest performance metrics – and testers will measure the chip to confirm it can “run all supported cryptographic algorithms correctly” at the stated speeds. Hardware true random number generation (TRNG) or secure pseudo-random (DRBG) capabilities are also mandated as part of cryptographic support, with high-security applications expected to use TRNGs and meet the randomness quality requirements defined by Chinese standards.
- Secure Boot: A secure boot mechanism is a cornerstone of the standard’s requirements. The automotive chip must only boot from an immutable hardware trust root, ensuring that the very first code executed (such as a Boot ROM or a one-time-programmable memory containing the bootloader) is fixed and cannot be altered by attackers. Using this hardware root of trust, the chip is required to verify the authenticity and integrity of each stage of firmware during the startup process (e.g. the Bootloader and then the main system firmware) before executing it. If any code has been tampered with or corrupted, the chip should detect it and prevent an insecure boot – for instance, by refusing to run unauthorized firmware and invoking secure error-handling routines rather than allowing compromised code to operate. The standard also calls for protection of any keys used in the secure boot process. Public keys used for signature verification must be kept integral (for example, stored as an immutable hash or in fuse memory) so that they cannot be modified. If the secure boot relies on symmetric authentication (e.g. a message authentication code), the confidentiality and integrity of the secret key must likewise be assured by hardware means (such as restricting access and preventing any illicit readout or tampering of that key). Notably, the draft specifies that each chip should use a unique key for secure boot if symmetric keys are involved, so that a breach of one device’s key cannot be leveraged to compromise others. In summary, the chip’s startup sequence needs to be cryptographically anchored such that only genuine, unaltered firmware can run, and the secrets that underpin this trust (boot keys) are locked down by hardware.
- Security Lifecycle Management: The specification extends security to how chips are managed over their entire lifecycle (from production to end-of-life). Automotive chips are required to support hardware-based security lifecycle states and controls. In practice, this means a chip should have the capability to operate in different modes or stages (for example, a development/debug stage, a production stage, and possibly provisioning or maintenance modes) with restrictions appropriate to each. The current lifecycle stage must be recorded in a tamper-proof, non-volatile memory area on the chip – such as an eFuse or one-time-programmable (OTP) memory – to prevent an attacker from rolling back the device to a less secure state. The chip should allow secure transitions from one stage to another (e.g. from an unlocked factory state to a locked-down operational state), and once transitioned to a higher security stage, it should not be possible to revert to a previous, less secure stage. Along with this, the standard mandates that chips enforce access controls according to their lifecycle stage. For example, during the production and field stage, critical debug or test interfaces should be disabled or require special authentication, whereas in a development stage an OEM or supplier might have access to certain test functions. Likewise, sensitive cryptographic material or safety parameters should only be accessible in appropriate stages – the chip should prevent, say, an attempt to read out keys or modify security-critical settings when it’s in a locked production mode. These lifecycle features ensure that even if a chip falls into an attacker’s hands, they cannot abuse diagnostic functionalities or other backdoors that are meant only for factory use. OEMs and Tier-1 suppliers will need to design their chips and processes to incorporate these stage controls, tying in with secure production programming and key provisioning workflows.
- Personal Information Protection: In line with broader data privacy trends, the draft standard includes requirements to safeguard personal data at the chip level. Automotive chips should not store any personal information beyond what is necessary for their function and explicitly declared; arbitrary storage of user data on chips is prohibited. If a chip does handle personal data (for example, biometric identifiers, user identifiers, or sensitive calibration tied to individuals), the chip must support encrypted storage of that information and ensure it cannot be accessed or extracted without proper authorization. Additionally, the standard addresses data in transit from the chip: it forbids “private transmission” of user personal information, meaning a chip should not send out personal data through its interfaces unless this is an intended, declared function – and if such transmission is needed (perhaps as part of a feature), the data must be encrypted in transit. The goal is to prevent stealthy leaks of personal data from within the vehicle’s hardware. This requirement will push suppliers to consider what user data, if any, their chips store (e.g. does an infotainment SoC store contacts or fingerprints? does a telematics module cache personal GPS history?), and to implement hardware-enforced encryption or access control for any such data. It aligns with China’s personal information protection law by ensuring privacy is preserved even at the device level.
(Note: Beyond the above, the forthcoming standard covers several other areas of hardware security. This includes secure firmware update support (requiring cryptographic validation of updates and rollback prevention), resource access control (guarding memory and peripheral interfaces via privilege controls), secure execution environments (such as requiring isolation of a secure processing domain within the chip for sensitive code), self-test mechanisms (power-on self diagnostics for security functions), physical tamper resistance (measures to detect or resist invasive attacks on the chip), and vulnerability management (ensuring known security flaws are addressed). The comprehensive scope indicates that chips will be evaluated on a wide range of security features, making hardware security an integral part of automotive chip design rather than an afterthought.)
Testing and Compliance
One notable aspect of this GB/T draft is that it not only defines requirements but also lays out how they are to be tested and validated. Chapter 9 of the specification provides detailed test methods for each security function, which means compliance will involve both documentation review and hands-on evaluation of the chip. In practice, meeting the standard will require manufacturers to do the following:
- Documentation Checks: The chip manufacturer (or submitting party) must provide extensive documentation for the product’s security features. This includes design descriptions of how each requirement in the standard is implemented – for example, explaining the key storage architecture, the cryptographic algorithms supported, secure boot flow, etc. The draft explicitly requires the manufacturer to submit documentation corresponding to each clause (sections 9.2 through 9.15 outline the expected documentation items for every technical requirement). The manufacturer must also make a formal self-declaration that the provided information accurately reflects the product’s design and behavior. These documents will be scrutinized by evaluators to verify that the chip’s design principles meet the standard’s criteria on paper before testing begins. Any gap in documentation (for instance, not describing how a root key is managed or how lifecycle states are handled) could lead to non-compliance. Thus, OEMs and suppliers should be prepared for a significant documentation effort, likely in Chinese, detailing their chip’s security mechanisms in alignment with the standard.
- Lab Testing: In addition to paperwork, the standard mandates direct testing of the chip’s security functions in a lab setting. Manufacturers will need to provide the actual product sample (the chip or chipset), along with any necessary support hardware and software for testing – such as evaluation boards, test software, and interface documentation. Testers will then perform the specific procedures defined in the standard’s test method sections (9.x). These include functional tests like verifying that cryptographic algorithms operate correctly and within claimed performance, checking that random number generators meet statistical requirements, and attempting various security attacks or misuse scenarios to ensure the chip’s protections hold up. For example, the key management tests instruct the evaluator to try updating and exporting cryptographic keys both with proper authorization and without, to confirm that the chip prevents any unauthorized key changes or extraction. In the secure boot test, the lab might try to boot the chip with a tampered firmware image to ensure it fails to authenticate, and verify that the chip only boots when the image is legitimate. The testing methodology is quite granular – e.g., the cryptographic support test requires running at least 10 sets of encryption/decryption operations and comparing the throughput against the vendor’s claims. All these results are documented as evidence of compliance. Manufacturers should anticipate working closely with accredited test laboratories and possibly conducting extensive pre-tests internally to make sure their chips will pass the official compliance tests. The presence of defined test cases in the standard essentially creates a checklist for compliance: a chip either passes all the listed tests (and thus meets the requirements) or it will be sent back for improvements. This approach underscores the seriousness of China’s intent – it’s not just setting guidelines but ensuring they are verifiable and enforceable.
Strategic Implications for OEMs and Tier-1 Suppliers
For international OEMs and Tier-1 suppliers aiming to sell in China, this emerging standard has significant strategic implications. It raises the bar for hardware security in automotive electronics, and companies will need to adapt in several ways:
- Product Design and Feature Integration: Manufacturers may need to redesign or augment their automotive chips to incorporate the required security features. Many of the standard’s mandates (secure boot, encrypted storage, hardware unique keys, etc.) align with best practices, but not all existing chips, especially legacy designs, will meet them out of the box. International chip suppliers must ensure that cryptographic algorithms favored by Chinese standards (e.g., domestic algorithms like SM2/SM4 in addition to AES and RSA) are supported in hardware, since the specification insists on compliance with national cryptography requirements. Features such as one-time programmable memory for lifecycle state storage, dedicated security cores or enclaves for isolated execution, and true random number generators might need to be added or enhanced on chip designs that target the China market. Additionally, the requirement for per-chip unique keys (for secure boot or other functions) means companies must establish secure provisioning processes in manufacturing – injecting unique credentials into each device, as opposed to using shared keys – which can be a significant change in production workflow. Overall, the hardware development cycle will need to incorporate these security elements early in the design phase to avoid costly reworks.
- Compliance Engineering and Documentation: OEMs and suppliers will have to invest in compliance engineering to meet the documentation and testing expectations. Preparing the detailed technical documentation (in alignment with sections 9.2–9.15 of the standard) is a non-trivial task – it requires a deep understanding of the product’s security architecture and likely the ability to communicate it in the format Chinese auditors expect. Companies may need to allocate resources for technical writers or engineers who specialize in cybersecurity compliance. This includes possibly translating internal design documents into Chinese and ensuring they directly map to each requirement clause. The standard essentially forces transparency of the security design: anything not documented and justified could be seen as non-compliant. Moreover, the testing phase will require working with Chinese labs or authorities. International firms might need to partner with local test agencies or set up China-specific testing capabilities to pre-validate their products. Time and budget should be allocated for multiple rounds of testing, as discovering an issue (for example, random number generator not meeting the GB/T 32915 randomness criteria) could necessitate design modifications and re-testing.
- Supply Chain and Component Selection: OEMs will have to ensure that all critical chips in their vehicles destined for China meet these security standards. This may influence supplier selection and contractual requirements. For instance, a Tier-1 supplier providing an ECU to an OEM will need to guarantee that the microcontroller or system-on-chip inside that ECU is compliant with the Chinese standard. Suppliers who are already implementing strong security (perhaps to comply with UN ECE R155 or ISO 21434 elsewhere) will have an advantage, but they must double-check specifics – Chinese requirements can be more prescriptive in certain areas. There could be cases where an automaker has to choose a different chip vendor for the China market if their global supplier’s hardware cannot be brought up to the required level of security in time. Additionally, vulnerability management becomes a shared responsibility: the standard expects chip makers to monitor and promptly fix security vulnerabilities in their products (with a clear expectation that no high-severity vulnerability older than six months should remain unpatched in shipping chips). This means OEMs and Tier-1s must maintain close communication with chip suppliers regarding any newly discovered chip flaws and patches. It may also entail planning for secure software updates in the vehicle to patch chip firmware or ROM code, if issues are found post-deployment. In contract terms, OEMs might require suppliers to commit to long-term security support and to follow the standard’s vulnerability disclosure/mitigation timelines so that the vehicle remains compliant throughout its service life.
- Market Access and Competitive Advantage: From a market access perspective, complying with this standard will likely be a gating item for selling vehicles or vehicle components in China once the standard is enacted. While GB/T standards are technically “recommended,” in practice they often become de facto mandatory – for example, through incorporation into procurement specs, type-approval tests, or cybersecurity review processes. An OEM that ignores these hardware security requirements could face certification difficulties or reputational risks in China. On the other hand, early adopters of these security measures might gain a competitive edge. Demonstrating compliance can be a selling point, signaling that a company takes cybersecurity seriously and is aligned with China’s regulatory direction. It may also streamline approvals if China introduces a compulsory certification for automotive cybersecurity. Furthermore, enhancements made to satisfy this Chinese standard could be leveraged globally: as vehicles worldwide move toward stricter cyber regulations, having chips with built-in security (secure boot, HSM capabilities, etc.) will be beneficial for compliance in other regions too. Suppliers can position such secure hardware as premium offerings not just for China but for any security-conscious customer.
In summary, international OEMs and Tier-1s must view China’s automotive chip security standard not just as a local technical guideline but as a strategic requirement. It affects product development (necessitating new hardware features), engineering processes (documentation and testing), and supply chain choices. Companies should start gap assessments now – comparing their current chips’ capabilities against the draft’s requirements – and plan the necessary upgrades or mitigations. Engaging with the standard’s development (via industry feedback or through local partners) can also help companies anticipate final changes and timelines. Those who proactively align their designs and processes with these requirements will be in a stronger position to maintain uninterrupted access to the world’s largest automotive market, whereas those who delay may encounter compliance roadblocks down the line.
Conclusion
China’s upcoming GB/T automotive chip security standard represents a significant step in codifying cybersecurity at the hardware level for vehicles. It reflects the growing consensus that robust vehicle security must start from the silicon upward. As detailed above, the standard covers everything from secure boot and cryptography to lifecycle controls and privacy protection, coupled with defined tests to enforce each requirement. The draft is in the final stages of refinement, with the working group soliciting opinions and preparing the text for official release. Given the urgency of cybersecurity concerns, stakeholders should expect this standard (once finalized) to be rapidly taken up as a benchmark for best practice – and possibly to form the basis of mandatory regulations or certification criteria in China.
For OEMs and Tier-1 suppliers, the time to act is now. Alignment with the draft requirements should be treated as a high priority in product roadmaps and compliance planning. Next steps include conducting thorough reviews of current chips against the standard, investing in necessary hardware modifications (or new developments) to fill security gaps, and preparing the required documentation and test evidence. Companies may also consider training their engineering teams on the specifics of Chinese cybersecurity standards and perhaps collaborating with Chinese research institutes or labs to ensure mutual understanding. By doing so, they not only mitigate the risk of non-compliance but also contribute to a safer automotive ecosystem overall.
In conclusion, China’s push for a hardware security standard in automotive chips is setting a clear expectation: future vehicles should be built on secure hardware foundations. Suppliers and automakers globally would do well to heed this direction. Those who move swiftly to upgrade their hardware security and comply with the GB/T specification will not only ease their entry into China’s market but also enhance their resilience against cyber threats worldwide. The window before the standard becomes fully effective is a critical period – and savvy industry players will use it to upgrade technologies, refine their security processes, and ultimately deliver vehicles that meet the stringent security demands of regulators and customers alike. Compliance is not just a box to check for China, but a catalyst to elevate cybersecurity standards across all products and regions. The message is clear: start strengthening automotive hardware security now, or risk being left behind as the industry standard rises.
Sources: The information in this article is based on the draft “Information Security Technology – Technical Specification for Automotive Chips” as summarized in the Industry Technical Specifications Research Report of Cybersecurity Vehicle Chip (April 25, 2025), which outlines the requirements and test methods under development by the Chinese standardization working group. All technical details and quotes are drawn from this draft specification, reflecting the most current understanding of the forthcoming GB/T standard on automotive chip hardware security.
