# China’s New Hardware Security Standard for Automotive Chips: Key Requirements and Implications

- Link: https://smartnuts.com/2025/07/16/chinas-new-hardware-security-standard-for-automotive-chips-key-requirements-and-implications/
- Veröffentlicht: 2025-07-16T12:47:23+02:00
- Autor: Michael Bunzel

## Introduction

Automotive cybersecurity has rapidly become a critical priority as vehicles integrate
more electronic control units (ECUs), connectivity, and advanced driving features.
While past efforts often focused on software, attention is now turning to the hardware
level – especially the semiconductor chips that execute safety-critical and security
functions. Secure automotive chips can protect cryptographic keys, verify firmware
integrity, and resist tampering, forming the foundation of a vehicle’s overall cybersecurity.
In China, regulators and industry experts have been developing a comprehensive hardware
security standard for automotive chips to address emerging threats. This upcoming
national standard (a _GB/T_ recommended standard) aims to ensure that in-vehicle
chips possess robust security mechanisms by design. The following analysis provides
an overview of this draft standard’s development and its key technical requirements,
as well as what it means for OEMs and Tier-1 suppliers looking to comply and maintain
access to the Chinese market.

---

## Regulatory Framework

China’s automotive chip security standard is currently in draft form and undergoing
industry consultation. The project was initiated in 2022 under a dedicated working
group of experts, and has since gone through numerous iterations and meetings to
refine its content. As of April 2025, the drafting group had conducted 18 meetings
to debate and revise the technical requirements, test methods, and scope of the 
specification. The draft text is now essentially complete and is being circulated
within the working group for feedback. After internal consensus, the next steps 
involve polishing the text based on comments and then moving toward broader review
and approval.

Although formal standard number designations are pending final release, the effort
is commonly referred to as a new GB/T (national recommended) standard for automotive
chip information security. It has been spearheaded by a drafting committee likely
comprising government agencies, research institutes, automakers, and semiconductor
companies in China. Their collaborative process – including detailed chapter-by-
chapter reviews and multiple revisions – underscores the importance Chinese authorities
place on securing automotive hardware. The standard is part of a broader regulatory
framework in China that addresses vehicle cybersecurity (complementing earlier guidelines
for vehicle software security and data protection). Once finalized, this GB/T specification
could be referenced in certification requirements (such as China’s CCC certification
for auto parts) or future regulations, effectively making its adoption necessary
for any company aiming to supply vehicle chips or electronic systems in the Chinese
market. In short, China is proactively creating its own baseline for automotive 
hardware security, and international OEMs and suppliers will need to follow this
development closely.

---

## Technical Requirements Overview

The draft standard defines a comprehensive set of mandatory hardware security capabilities
for automotive chips. It breaks down the overall security needs of in-vehicle systems
and maps them to specific security functions that a chip must implement. Key areas
of focus include cryptographic features, secure boot processes, key management, 
data protection, and controls tied to the chip’s lifecycle. Below is an overview
of some of the most important requirements:

 * **Key Protection:** The standard places heavy emphasis on cryptographic key management
   and protection within the chip. Automotive chips must implement secure key generation(
   using quality hardware random number sources) and keep master keys in a hardware-
   protected trust anchor on the chip. A unique hardware root key should serve as
   the system’s root of trust, and any non-volatile keys stored off-chip (if used
   at all) must be encrypted under that on-chip root key. The chip must provide 
   isolated, tamper-resistant storage areas so that keys and related secrets cannot
   be accessed or extracted via any physical or logical interface. During operation,
   keys’ integrity should be checked before use, and no sensitive key material or
   related information may leak through external interfaces or debugging ports. 
   The standard also requires that once a key’s use is finished, the chip should
   immediately purge it from any temporary memory to prevent remnants from being
   recovered. Additionally, strict access control mechanisms are mandated – for 
   example, the chip should detect and respond to any unauthorized attempts to access
   or tamper with keys (e.g. by automatically destroying or locking the affected
   key) and enforce permissions for key usage (including support for multiple key
   owners or domains if applicable) to ensure keys can only be used or updated by
   authorized entities. It also covers the full key lifecycle: chips need to support
   secure key provisioning (establishment), key derivation functions, secure key
   updates (with old keys being immediately and securely erased), and secure key
   destruction on demand. In essence, robust **Hardware Security Module (HSM)**-
   like functionality is expected on the chip to manage all cryptographic keys safely
   through their lifecycle.
 * **Cryptographic Algorithm Support:** The hardware must support strong cryptographic
   algorithms and adhere to recognized standards. The draft specifies that automotive
   chips should only employ cryptographic algorithms that meet relevant international,
   national, or industry cryptography standards – or otherwise be publicly known
   algorithms that have undergone sufficient scrutiny – and avoid any algorithms
   with known security weaknesses. This implies that chips will be expected to implement
   approved cipher suites (including China’s own standard algorithms where applicable)
   and use appropriate key lengths and parameters to ensure adequate security strength.
   Moreover, the standard addresses the performance of cryptographic operations:
   it requires that a chip’s claimed cryptographic performance (for example, the
   throughput or latency of encryption/decryption under certain conditions) is verified
   and consistent with the manufacturer’s specifications. In practice, this means
   chip makers must not only include crypto engines (for symmetric ciphers, public
   key algorithms, hash functions, etc.) but also provide honest performance metrics–
   and testers will measure the chip to confirm it can “run all supported cryptographic
   algorithms correctly” at the stated speeds. Hardware true random number generation(
   TRNG) or secure pseudo-random (DRBG) capabilities are also mandated as part of
   cryptographic support, with high-security applications expected to use TRNGs 
   and meet the randomness quality requirements defined by Chinese standards.
 * **Secure Boot:** A secure boot mechanism is a cornerstone of the standard’s requirements.
   The automotive chip must **only boot from an immutable hardware trust root**,
   ensuring that the very first code executed (such as a Boot ROM or a one-time-
   programmable memory containing the bootloader) is fixed and cannot be altered
   by attackers. Using this hardware root of trust, the chip is required to verify
   the authenticity and integrity of each stage of firmware during the startup process(
   e.g. the Bootloader and then the main system firmware) before executing it. If
   any code has been tampered with or corrupted, the chip should detect it and prevent
   an insecure boot – for instance, by refusing to run unauthorized firmware and
   invoking secure error-handling routines rather than allowing compromised code
   to operate. The standard also calls for protection of any keys used in the secure
   boot process. Public keys used for signature verification must be kept integral(
   for example, stored as an immutable hash or in fuse memory) so that they cannot
   be modified. If the secure boot relies on symmetric authentication (e.g. a message
   authentication code), the confidentiality and integrity of the secret key must
   likewise be assured by hardware means (such as restricting access and preventing
   any illicit readout or tampering of that key). Notably, the draft specifies that
   each chip should use a unique key for secure boot if symmetric keys are involved,
   so that a breach of one device’s key cannot be leveraged to compromise others.
   In summary, the chip’s startup sequence needs to be cryptographically anchored
   such that only genuine, unaltered firmware can run, and the secrets that underpin
   this trust (boot keys) are locked down by hardware.
 * **Security Lifecycle Management:** The specification extends security to how 
   chips are managed over their entire lifecycle (from production to end-of-life).
   Automotive chips are required to support hardware-based security lifecycle states
   and controls. In practice, this means a chip should have the capability to operate
   in different modes or stages (for example, a development/debug stage, a production
   stage, and possibly provisioning or maintenance modes) with restrictions appropriate
   to each. The current **lifecycle stage must be recorded in a tamper-proof, non-
   volatile memory area** on the chip – such as an eFuse or one-time-programmable(
   OTP) memory – to prevent an attacker from rolling back the device to a less secure
   state. The chip should allow **secure transitions** from one stage to another(
   e.g. from an unlocked factory state to a locked-down operational state), and 
   once transitioned to a higher security stage, it should not be possible to revert
   to a previous, less secure stage. Along with this, the standard mandates that
   chips enforce access controls according to their lifecycle stage. For example,
   during the production and field stage, critical debug or test interfaces should
   be disabled or require special authentication, whereas in a development stage
   an OEM or supplier might have access to certain test functions. Likewise, sensitive
   cryptographic material or safety parameters should only be accessible in appropriate
   stages – the chip should prevent, say, an attempt to read out keys or modify 
   security-critical settings when it’s in a locked production mode. These lifecycle
   features ensure that even if a chip falls into an attacker’s hands, they cannot
   abuse diagnostic functionalities or other backdoors that are meant only for factory
   use. OEMs and Tier-1 suppliers will need to design their chips and processes 
   to incorporate these stage controls, tying in with secure production programming
   and key provisioning workflows.
 * **Personal Information Protection:** In line with broader data privacy trends,
   the draft standard includes requirements to safeguard personal data at the chip
   level. Automotive chips should **not store any personal information** beyond 
   what is necessary for their function and explicitly declared; arbitrary storage
   of user data on chips is prohibited. If a chip does handle personal data (for
   example, biometric identifiers, user identifiers, or sensitive calibration tied
   to individuals), the chip must support **encrypted storage** of that information
   and ensure it cannot be accessed or extracted without proper authorization. Additionally,
   the standard addresses data in transit from the chip: it forbids “private transmission”
   of user personal information, meaning a chip should not send out personal data
   through its interfaces unless this is an intended, declared function – and if
   such transmission is needed (perhaps as part of a feature), the data must be 
   encrypted in transit. The goal is to prevent stealthy leaks of personal data 
   from within the vehicle’s hardware. This requirement will push suppliers to consider
   what user data, if any, their chips store (e.g. does an infotainment SoC store
   contacts or fingerprints? does a telematics module cache personal GPS history?),
   and to implement hardware-enforced encryption or access control for any such 
   data. It aligns with China’s personal information protection law by ensuring 
   privacy is preserved even at the device level.

**(Note:** Beyond the above, the forthcoming standard covers several other areas
of hardware security. This includes **secure firmware update support** (requiring
cryptographic validation of updates and rollback prevention), **resource access 
control** (guarding memory and peripheral interfaces via privilege controls), **
secure execution environments** (such as requiring isolation of a secure processing
domain within the chip for sensitive code), **self-test mechanisms** (power-on self
diagnostics for security functions), **physical tamper resistance** (measures to
detect or resist invasive attacks on the chip), and **vulnerability management**(
ensuring known security flaws are addressed). The comprehensive scope indicates 
that chips will be evaluated on a wide range of security features, making hardware
security an integral part of automotive chip design rather than an afterthought.)

---

## Testing and Compliance

One notable aspect of this GB/T draft is that it not only defines requirements but
also lays out how they are to be tested and validated. Chapter 9 of the specification
provides detailed **test methods** for each security function, which means compliance
will involve both documentation review and hands-on evaluation of the chip. In practice,
meeting the standard will require manufacturers to do the following:

 * **Documentation Checks:** The chip manufacturer (or submitting party) must provide
   extensive documentation for the product’s security features. This includes design
   descriptions of how each requirement in the standard is implemented – for example,
   explaining the key storage architecture, the cryptographic algorithms supported,
   secure boot flow, etc. The draft explicitly requires the manufacturer to submit
   documentation corresponding to each clause (sections 9.2 through 9.15 outline
   the expected documentation items for every technical requirement). The manufacturer
   must also make a formal self-declaration that the provided information accurately
   reflects the product’s design and behavior. These documents will be scrutinized
   by evaluators to verify that the chip’s design principles meet the standard’s
   criteria on paper before testing begins. Any gap in documentation (for instance,
   not describing how a root key is managed or how lifecycle states are handled)
   could lead to non-compliance. Thus, OEMs and suppliers should be prepared for
   a **significant documentation effort**, likely in Chinese, detailing their chip’s
   security mechanisms in alignment with the standard.
 * **Lab Testing:** In addition to paperwork, the standard mandates direct testing
   of the chip’s security functions in a lab setting. Manufacturers will need to
   provide the actual product sample (the chip or chipset), along with any necessary
   support hardware and software for testing – such as evaluation boards, test software,
   and interface documentation. Testers will then perform the specific procedures
   defined in the standard’s test method sections (9.x). These include functional
   tests like verifying that cryptographic algorithms operate correctly and within
   claimed performance, checking that random number generators meet statistical 
   requirements, and attempting various security attacks or misuse scenarios to 
   ensure the chip’s protections hold up. For example, the key management tests 
   instruct the evaluator to try updating and exporting cryptographic keys both 
   with proper authorization and without, to confirm that the chip prevents any 
   unauthorized key changes or extraction. In the secure boot test, the lab might
   try to boot the chip with a tampered firmware image to ensure it fails to authenticate,
   and verify that the chip only boots when the image is legitimate. The testing
   methodology is quite granular – e.g., the cryptographic support test requires
   running at least 10 sets of encryption/decryption operations and comparing the
   throughput against the vendor’s claims. All these results are documented as evidence
   of compliance. Manufacturers should anticipate working closely with accredited
   test laboratories and possibly conducting extensive pre-tests internally to make
   sure their chips will pass the official compliance tests. The presence of defined
   test cases in the standard essentially creates a **checklist for compliance**:
   a chip either passes all the listed tests (and thus meets the requirements) or
   it will be sent back for improvements. This approach underscores the seriousness
   of China’s intent – it’s not just setting guidelines but ensuring they are verifiable
   and enforceable.

---

## Strategic Implications for OEMs and Tier-1 Suppliers

For international OEMs and Tier-1 suppliers aiming to sell in China, this emerging
standard has significant strategic implications. It raises the bar for hardware 
security in automotive electronics, and companies will need to adapt in several 
ways:

 * **Product Design and Feature Integration:** Manufacturers may need to redesign
   or augment their automotive chips to incorporate the required security features.
   Many of the standard’s mandates (secure boot, encrypted storage, hardware unique
   keys, etc.) align with best practices, but not all existing chips, especially
   legacy designs, will meet them out of the box. International chip suppliers must
   ensure that cryptographic algorithms favored by Chinese standards (e.g., domestic
   algorithms like SM2/SM4 in addition to AES and RSA) are supported in hardware,
   since the specification insists on compliance with national cryptography requirements.
   Features such as one-time programmable memory for lifecycle state storage, dedicated
   security cores or enclaves for isolated execution, and true random number generators
   might need to be added or enhanced on chip designs that target the China market.
   Additionally, the requirement for per-chip unique keys (for secure boot or other
   functions) means companies must establish secure provisioning processes in manufacturing–
   injecting unique credentials into each device, as opposed to using shared keys–
   which can be a significant change in production workflow. Overall, the hardware
   development cycle will need to incorporate these security elements early in the
   design phase to avoid costly reworks.
 * **Compliance Engineering and Documentation:** OEMs and suppliers will have to
   invest in compliance engineering to meet the documentation and testing expectations.
   Preparing the detailed technical documentation (in alignment with sections 9.2–
   9.15 of the standard) is a non-trivial task – it requires a deep understanding
   of the product’s security architecture and likely the ability to communicate 
   it in the format Chinese auditors expect. Companies may need to allocate resources
   for technical writers or engineers who specialize in cybersecurity compliance.
   This includes possibly translating internal design documents into Chinese and
   ensuring they directly map to each requirement clause. The standard essentially
   forces transparency of the security design: anything not documented and justified
   could be seen as non-compliant. Moreover, the testing phase will require working
   with Chinese labs or authorities. International firms might need to partner with
   local test agencies or set up China-specific testing capabilities to pre-validate
   their products. Time and budget should be allocated for multiple rounds of testing,
   as discovering an issue (for example, random number generator not meeting the
   GB/T 32915 randomness criteria) could necessitate design modifications and re-
   testing.
 * **Supply Chain and Component Selection:** OEMs will have to ensure that all critical
   chips in their vehicles destined for China meet these security standards. This
   may influence supplier selection and contractual requirements. For instance, 
   a Tier-1 supplier providing an ECU to an OEM will need to guarantee that the 
   microcontroller or system-on-chip inside that ECU is compliant with the Chinese
   standard. Suppliers who are already implementing strong security (perhaps to 
   comply with UN ECE R155 or ISO 21434 elsewhere) will have an advantage, but they
   must double-check specifics – Chinese requirements can be more prescriptive in
   certain areas. There could be cases where an automaker has to choose a different
   chip vendor for the China market if their global supplier’s hardware cannot be
   brought up to the required level of security in time. Additionally, **vulnerability
   management** becomes a shared responsibility: the standard expects chip makers
   to monitor and promptly fix security vulnerabilities in their products (with 
   a clear expectation that no high-severity vulnerability older than six months
   should remain unpatched in shipping chips). This means OEMs and Tier-1s must 
   maintain close communication with chip suppliers regarding any newly discovered
   chip flaws and patches. It may also entail planning for secure software updates
   in the vehicle to patch chip firmware or ROM code, if issues are found post-deployment.
   In contract terms, OEMs might require suppliers to commit to long-term security
   support and to follow the standard’s vulnerability disclosure/mitigation timelines
   so that the vehicle remains compliant throughout its service life.
 * **Market Access and Competitive Advantage:** From a market access perspective,
   complying with this standard will likely be a gating item for selling vehicles
   or vehicle components in China once the standard is enacted. While GB/T standards
   are technically “recommended,” in practice they often become de facto mandatory–
   for example, through incorporation into procurement specs, type-approval tests,
   or cybersecurity review processes. An OEM that ignores these hardware security
   requirements could face certification difficulties or reputational risks in China.
   On the other hand, early adopters of these security measures might gain a competitive
   edge. Demonstrating compliance can be a selling point, signaling that a company
   takes cybersecurity seriously and is aligned with China’s regulatory direction.
   It may also streamline approvals if China introduces a compulsory certification
   for automotive cybersecurity. Furthermore, enhancements made to satisfy this 
   Chinese standard could be leveraged globally: as vehicles worldwide move toward
   stricter cyber regulations, having chips with built-in security (secure boot,
   HSM capabilities, etc.) will be beneficial for compliance in other regions too.
   Suppliers can position such secure hardware as premium offerings not just for
   China but for any security-conscious customer.

In summary, international OEMs and Tier-1s must view China’s automotive chip security
standard not just as a local technical guideline but as a strategic requirement.
It affects product development (necessitating new hardware features), engineering
processes (documentation and testing), and supply chain choices. Companies should
start **gap assessments** now – comparing their current chips’ capabilities against
the draft’s requirements – and plan the necessary upgrades or mitigations. Engaging
with the standard’s development (via industry feedback or through local partners)
can also help companies anticipate final changes and timelines. Those who proactively
align their designs and processes with these requirements will be in a stronger 
position to maintain uninterrupted access to the world’s largest automotive market,
whereas those who delay may encounter compliance roadblocks down the line.

---

## Conclusion

China’s upcoming GB/T automotive chip security standard represents a significant
step in codifying cybersecurity at the hardware level for vehicles. It reflects 
the growing consensus that robust vehicle security must start from the silicon upward.
As detailed above, the standard covers everything from secure boot and cryptography
to lifecycle controls and privacy protection, coupled with defined tests to enforce
each requirement. The draft is in the final stages of refinement, with the working
group soliciting opinions and preparing the text for official release. Given the
urgency of cybersecurity concerns, stakeholders should expect this standard (once
finalized) to be rapidly taken up as a benchmark for best practice – and possibly
to form the basis of mandatory regulations or certification criteria in China.

For OEMs and Tier-1 suppliers, the time to act is now. **Alignment with the draft
requirements should be treated as a high priority** in product roadmaps and compliance
planning. Next steps include conducting thorough reviews of current chips against
the standard, investing in necessary hardware modifications (or new developments)
to fill security gaps, and preparing the required documentation and test evidence.
Companies may also consider training their engineering teams on the specifics of
Chinese cybersecurity standards and perhaps collaborating with Chinese research 
institutes or labs to ensure mutual understanding. By doing so, they not only mitigate
the risk of non-compliance but also contribute to a safer automotive ecosystem overall.

In conclusion, China’s push for a hardware security standard in automotive chips
is setting a clear expectation: future vehicles should be built on secure hardware
foundations. Suppliers and automakers globally would do well to heed this direction.
Those who move swiftly to upgrade their hardware security and comply with the GB/
T specification will not only ease their entry into China’s market but also enhance
their resilience against cyber threats worldwide. The window before the standard
becomes fully effective is a critical period – and savvy industry players will use
it to upgrade technologies, refine their security processes, and ultimately deliver
vehicles that meet the stringent security demands of regulators and customers alike.
Compliance is not just a box to check for China, but a catalyst to elevate cybersecurity
standards across all products and regions. **The message is clear: start strengthening
automotive hardware security now, or risk being left behind as the industry standard
rises.**

**Sources:** The information in this article is based on the draft “Information 
Security Technology – Technical Specification for Automotive Chips” as summarized
in the _Industry Technical Specifications Research Report of Cybersecurity Vehicle
Chip (April 25, 2025)_, which outlines the requirements and test methods under development
by the Chinese standardization working group. All technical details and quotes are
drawn from this draft specification, reflecting the most current understanding of
the forthcoming GB/T standard on automotive chip hardware security.
