# EURO-NCAP VSDPS: Innovation or Institutional Overreach?

- Link: https://smartnuts.com/2025/07/10/euro-ncap-vsdps-innovation-or-institutional-overreach/
- Veröffentlicht: 2025-07-10T13:26:51+02:00
- Autor: Michael Bunzel

**A critical analysis of the VSDPS testing framework in light of existing regulation,
industrial realities, and technological developments**

### **Introduction**

Industry associations are businesses too – always on the lookout for new revenue
streams and monetisation models. Euro-NCAP is no exception: Having made its name(
and money) from vehicle safety assessments and crash tests, the organisation’s business
development executives seem to have had a moment of inspiration following the entry
into force of automotive cybersecurity regulations (including UN R155, GB 44495-
2024) and related industry standards (ISO/SAE 21434:2021, ISO/PAS 5112:2022, ISO/
SAE PAS 8475, ISO/SAE TR 8477). Their “brilliant idea”: expand their revenue-generating
activities to include the cybersecurity domain.

On the surface, it’s a logical progression – they started with safety ratings, added
assisted driving gradings, and now come cybersecurity ratings. With the latter, 
customers are meant to gain a third key insight: Not just whether they’re likely
to survive a crash, or whether the lane-keeping assistant will suddenly veer them
into a three-lane highway adventure – but also whether their car will still be where
they parked it in the morning, or whether hackers have already breached the vehicle’s
onboard network and tampered with critical data.

Through the introduction of VSDPS (Vehicle Security, Data Privacy and Sovereignty),
Euro-NCAP aims to establish a rating framework for in-vehicle IT security, privacy,
and data sovereignty – akin to its established crash tests and ADAS evaluations.
Yet what appears at first to be a forward-looking initiative quickly raises serious
concerns: methodologically, legally, and in terms of industrial policy.

---

## **I. Strategic Background: NCAP’s Overreach**

### 1. **Mandate Expansion Without Legitimacy**

OEMs perceive the VSDPS initiative as a strategic attempt by Euro-NCAP to extend
its influence into domains that lie well outside its established mandate. The evaluation
of Automotive Cybersecurity is already governed by legally binding frameworks such
as UN R155, EU7 (in certrain way), and GB 44495-2024 – all of which are tied to 
vehicle type approval. All the more astonishing, then, is the fact that Euro-NCAP–
a consortium of associations that includes not only automotive associations and 
insurance companies, but also senior federal authorities from Germany (such as the
Federal Ministry of Transport) and executive bodies from other European states –
appears to acquiesce without objection to the erosion of the normative framework
for automotive cybersecurity. This includes, for example, a shift away from a risk-
based approach towards a checklist-style requirement.

Either the participating authorities within the Euro-NCAP consortium are not involved
in the preliminary coordination of such initiatives, or they are simply indifferent.
Neither alternative reflects favourably on the operational conduct of Euro NCAP.

### 2. **Regulatory Competition Instead of Complementarity**

Instead of closing regulatory gaps, VSDPS creates a parallel assessment system that
imposes double work on OEMs without adding any clear benefit for consumers. This
duplication undermines regulatory consistency and clarity. In this context, any 
form of assessment of a vehicle’s cybersecurity capabilities ought to adhere closely
to the applicable normative requirements. It is neither appropriate nor advisable
to introduce alternative, potentially misleading, or wholly unsuitable criteria 
which would, in effect, establish a parallel framework of baseline requirements 
for automotive cybersecurity. At the very least, in light of its de facto ability
to influence end-user purchasing decisions, Euro-NCAP should recognise both the 
scope of its competence and the extent of its responsibility prior to the dissemination
of such proposals.

---

## **II. Methodological Critique: A Rigid Framework in a Dynamic Reality**

### 1. **Static Checklist Model vs. Risk-Based Security**

The VSDPS methodology is built around a predefined list of interfaces (Bluetooth,
USB, OBD, etc.). Vehicles that do not include certain technologies are automatically
penalised with zero points, regardless of whether these features are relevant or
required for the vehicle’s operation. That’s neither technically fair nor security-
relevant.

### 2. **Risk-Ignorant Scoring**

All vulnerabilities – regardless of their real-world security impact – are treated
equally. A successful roll-jam attack on keyless entry is rated the same as a theoretical
GPS spoofing scenario. This defies the core principles of risk-based security and
misallocates development and testing resources.

### 3. **Inapplicability = Penalty**

If a test cannot be applied due to the vehicle’s architecture or lack of a specific
interface, it is still rated as a failure. This amounts to systematic distortion
and unfair scoring against innovation and design diversity.

---

## **III. Technological Concerns: Past-Oriented Instead of Forward-Looking**

### 1. **Outdated Threat Assumptions**

VSDPS ignores modern vehicle architecture concepts such as over-the-air (OTA) updates,
Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) communication, secure boot, and zero-trust designs. 
Instead, it focuses on outdated vectors such as USB password strength or manual 
app installation from memory sticks.

### 2. **Testing Methodology Not Future-Proof**

The VSDPS approach lacks long-term applicability. As vehicle systems evolve rapidly,
many test criteria will become obsolete. Comparing ratings across model years will
become meaningless.

### 3. **Lack of Architectural Flexibility**

VSDPS is implicitly based on a monolithic view of vehicle E/E architectures. In 
reality, OEMs are increasingly deploying zonal, service-oriented, and software-defined
architectures. A “one-size-fits-all” test methodology is not viable in such a context.

---

## **IV. Data Privacy and Sovereignty: Legal and Practical Issues**

### 1. **Outdated Legal References**

The VSDPS paper references EU Directive 95/46/EC, which was repealed in 2018 and
replaced by the GDPR. This raises serious doubts about the legal literacy of the
proposal.

### 2. **“Data Sovereignty” as an Undefined Concept**

The term “data sovereignty” is overused without any legal anchoring, technical operationalisation,
or measurable test criteria. Most so-called “sovereignty tests” are usability assessments(“
Is it clear how to launch apps?”) and lack any actual security relevance.

### 3. **Conflict with Legal Obligations**

Some test items (e.g., requiring full internet disconnectability) directly conflict
with mandatory systems like eCall, for which connectivity is legally required. OEMs
are caught between contradictory demands.

---

## **V. Economic Implications for OEMs**

### 1. **Poor Cost-Benefit Ratio**

Implementing test structures to accommodate VSDPS adds cost in development, verification,
and documentation – with no demonstrable benefit over existing regulatory compliance.
For smaller OEMs in particular, this is a clear barrier to innovation.

### 2. **Risk of Market Distortion**

Vehicles may receive poor ratings due to irrelevant or superficial criteria. A technologically
advanced vehicle without a guest user profile, for instance, might score worse than
a simpler competitor model. This distorts competition.

### 3. **False Sense of Security**

A high VSDPS score might suggest a vehicle is “secure,” even though it merely passed
outdated or non-representative tests. This undermines real security engineering 
and promotes compliance over resilience.

---

## **Conclusion: VSDPS – A Well-Meant Misstep**

Euro-NCAP’s intention to raise awareness around vehicle cybersecurity is not wrong
in principle. But the VSDPS initiative in its current form fails on multiple levels.
It is methodologically unsound, technologically backward, legally confused, and 
economically burdensome.

OEMs should feel confident in pushing back – not because they oppose security, but
because security is too important to be trivialised by an ineffective and underdeveloped
scoring system.

German version? [Here …](https://smartnuts.com/2025/07/10/euro-ncap-vsdps-innovation-oder-institutionelle-expansion/)
